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Abstract
Martin Weitzman’s “Pandora’s problem” furnishes the mathematical basis for optimal search the-
ory in economics. Nearly 40 years later, Laura Doval introduced a version of the problem in which the
searcher is not obligated to pay the cost of inspecting an alternative’s value before selecting it. Unlike
the original Pandora’s problem, the version with nonobligatory inspection cannot be solved optimally
by any simple ranking-based policy, and it is unknown whether there exists any polynomial-time algo-
rithm to compute the optimal policy. is motivates the study of approximately optimal policies that
are simple and computationally efficient. In this work we provide the first non-trivial approximation
guarantees for this problem. We introduce a family of “commiing policies” such that it is computation-
ally easy to find and implement the optimal commiing policy. We prove that the optimal commiing
policy is guaranteed to approximate the fully optimal policy within a 1 − 1
e
= 0.63 . . . factor, and for
the special case of two boxes we improve this factor to 4/5 and show that this approximation is tight
for the class of commiing policies.
1 Introduction
Search theory, which concerns the ways in which costs of obtaining information affect the structure and
outcome of optimization procedures, was born in 1961 when the economist George Stigler [11] sought
to understand the phenomenon of price dispersion. When sellers charge different prices for identical
goods, why do consumers ever choose the higher-priced seller? Stigler realized that this counter-intuitive
behavior could be explained by search frictionswhereby consumersmust expend costly effort to find and/or
evaluate sellers.
e insight that optimization has qualitatively different outcomes under search frictions resounded
beyond economics, and particularly within computer science. Models of costly information acquisition
have been incorporated into information retrieval, robotics, database theory, distributed systems, and of
course also into sub-areas of CS such as algorithmic pricing and mechanism design that explicitly relate
to economics.
From a mathematical standpoint, the most foundational model of optimal search was articulated by
MartinWeitzman [12] under the name Pandora’s problem. e basic elements of the problem are as follows.
A searcher is allowed to select a prize from one of n closed boxes. e values of the prizes inside the boxes
are independent random variables, sampled from (not necessarily identical) distributions that are known
to the searcher. e searcher chooses a sequence of operations, each of which is either opening a box or
selecting the box. Opening box i has an associated cost ci and results in learning the value vi of the prize
∗Supported in part by NSF grant CCF-1512964.
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contained inside. Selecting box i results in a payoff of vi and immediately ends the search process; this
operation can only be performed aer box i has been opened. e searcher’s goal is to design an adaptive
policy (i.e., a choice of which operation to perform next, for every possible past history of operations and
their outcomes) to maximize the expectation of the prize selected, minus the sum of the inspection costs
accrued while opening boxes.
A priori, it would appear that the solution to Pandora’s problem may be horribly complex. An optimal
adaptive policy must specify the next operation to be performed given any past history. If each vi is drawn
from a distributionwith support size s, the number of possible histories is sn, so adaptive policies in general
have exponential description size. It is easy to see that the optimal policy can be implemented in space
poly(n, s), but there is no obvious reason why the complexity of Pandora’s problem should lie anywhere
below PSPACE.
Surprisingly, though, the solution to Pandora’s problem is not complex at all. Weitzman proved that
the optimal policy has a beautifully simple structure: one computes a reservation value for each box, sorts
them in decreasing order of reservation value, and opens them in this order, stopping and selecting the
first open box whose prize value exceeds the reservation value of every remaining closed box. is entire
process can be implemented to run in time O(ns log(ns)).
A key assumption in Pandora’s problem is that the searcher must open a box, and suffer the aendant
cost, before selecting it. is assumption limits the applicability of the model. Given that the value of
the prize inside a box is drawn from a distribution known in advance, in many cases it may be more
advantageous to select a box without paying to inspect its contents. For example, when using Pandora’s
problem to model a firm searching for an employee to hire, boxes represent job candidates. e cost of
opening a box represents the cost to the firm of undertaking a process, such as an interview or internship,
to assess the value of hiring a candidate. If the evidence of a candidate’s promise is sufficiently strong a
priori, it may be realistic to assume that the firm is willing to hire him or her directly, skipping the costly
evaluation process. is motivates a version of Pandora’s problem in which a box may be selected without
opening it, if the searcher so desires.
Given that Weitzman’s original model dates from 1979 and has been cited almost 900 times, it is quite
surprising that this close variant never appeared in the literature until a 2018 paper by Laura Doval [3].
e relative unpopularity of the variant with nonobligatory inspection can probably be aributed to the
apparent complexity and lack of structure in its optimal solution. For example, Doval presents an example
of a problem instance (Problem 3 in [3]) with three boxes — A, B, and C — such that the optimal policy first
opens box C, but the question of whether it subsequently opens box A before B or vice-versa depends on
the value of the prize discovered inside box C. As before, one can easily show that this variant of Pandora’s
problem belongs to PSPACE, but unlikeWeitzman’s version of Pandora’s problem, there is no evidence that
this version is easier than PSPACE-complete.
ese considerations motivate the study of approximately optimal policies that are computationally
efficient, structurally simple, or both. Our work initiates this study.
1.1 Our results and techniques
To put our results in context, we begin this section with an easy observation showing that simple, com-
putationally efficient policies can aain at least a 12 -approximation to the optimal policy. Consider the
following two policies.
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1. [Policy A] Run Weitzman’s optimal policy, ignoring the fact that the searcher has the option to
select boxes without opening them.
2. [Policy B] Leave every box closed, and select the one with the highest expected value.
Among all adaptive policies, Policy A is the one that maximizes the expected net contribution (i.e., the
value if selected, minus the inspection cost) of open boxes, whereas Policy B maximizes the expected
net contribution of closed boxes. Hence the combined value of Policies A and B bounds from above the
combined value that the optimal policy obtains from both open and closed boxes. e beer of A and B
must consequently aain at least half the value of the optimal policy.
For any specified ε > 0, it is not hard to construct a problem instance such that neither Policy A nor
Policy B aains more than 12 + ε of the value of the optimal policy. To achieve a beer approximation
factor, we focus on a broader class of simple policies that includes both of the aforementioned ones.
Let us define a commiing policy to be one that, before it opens any boxes, must pre-commit to a
partition of the n boxes into a set of boxes that will never be opened and a set that will never be selected
without first being opened; in addition it pre-commits to an order in which the boxes in the laer set will
be opened. Such a policy is almost non-adaptive; the only way in which it may adjust its behavior in
response to information revealed during the search process is that it may terminate the search early. In
this sense, questions about the ability of commiing policies to approximate the optimal adaptive policy
are akin to questions about adaptivity gaps in stochastic optimization [1, 2, 6, 7].
e foregoing discussion inspires two interrelated questions.
estion 1 For which values of α is there a polynomial-time algorithm that α-approximates the optimal
adaptive policy?
estion 2 What is the worst-case ratio between the value of the optimal commiing policy and that of the
optimal adaptive policy?
We show that for the general case of Pandora’s problemwith nonobligatory inspection, there is a polynomial-
time algorithm to identify the optimal commiing policy, and this policy always aains at least 1 − 1e =
0.63 . . . fraction of the optimal policy’s value. is furnishes a non-trivial lower bound on the answers
to estions 1 and 2 above. Our second main result fully seles estion 2 for the case of two boxes:
we show that the optimal commiing policy is always at least a 45 -approximation to the optimal adaptive
policy, and that this approximation factor is tight. e main question le open by our work is whether the
factor of 1 − 1e for the general case of n boxes can be improved. We conjecture that the answer is yes. In
fact, we believe it is plausible that the ratio between the values of the optimal commiing policy and the
optimal adaptive policy is never less than 45 , even when the number of boxes is greater than 2.
In the remainder of this section, we briefly discuss the techniques used to achieve these results. Our
proof that commiing policies aain a (1− 1e )-approximation to the value of the optimal adaptive policy
starts with a crucial observation: Pandora’s problem with nonobligatory inspection can be recast as an
equivalent problem in which inspection is obligatory, and the boxes are grouped into pairs each consisting
of one of the boxes from the original (nonobligatory) problem instance pairedwith a “doppelganger” whose
inspection cost is zero and whose value is deterministically equal to the expected value of the first box.
To make the problem with paired boxes equivalent to the original problem instance, we must impose an
additional constraint that search policies for the paired-box problem may open at most one of the two
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boxes in each pair. is reduction, which appears simple and natural in hindsight, is crucial because it
enables the application of two powerful tools. e first is a lemma of Kleinberg, Waggoner, and Weyl [8]
that reduces the analysis of policies for Pandora’s problem and generalizations to the analysis of algorithms
for the same optimization problem when the values of items are revealed for free, but are sampled from
modified distributions. In Section 2.2 we generalize the lemma to account for policies that may select a
box without opening it, a generalization which is vital for our application. e second tool is a theorem
of Asadpour and Nazerzadeh about the adaptivity gap of stochastic submodular function maximization
problems. Once Pandora’s problemwith nonobligatory inspection has been transformed into a formwhere
these two ingredients apply, the derivation of the (1− 1e )-approximation result becomes nearly automatic.
e combination of the two ingredients — the Kleinberg-Waggoner-Weyl amortization lemma from [8]
together with adaptivity gaps for stochastic probing — was pioneered by Singla [10] to solve a problem
he refers to as constrained utility maximization in the price of information model, which generalizes our
paired-box problem with probing constraints.
To prove that the optimal commiing policy can be identified in polynomial time we combine three
easy observations.
1. Of the 2n ways of partitioning the n boxes into those that always remain closed and those that are
never selected while closed, we need only consider the n + 1 partitions in which there is at most
one box of the former type.
2. For a fixed partition of boxes into two sets as above, the optimal commiing policy constrained to
use this partition can easily be determined by applying Weitzman’s theorem.
3. e value of this constrained optimal policy can be calculated in polynomial time.
Finally, to show that the gap between commiing policies and fully adaptive policies is 45 in the special
case of two boxes, we express the value of the optimal policy as a convex combination of two quantities:
its expected value conditional on selecting a closed box, and its expected value conditional on selecting an
open box. We then design a probability distribution over commiing policies whose expected value can be
bounded below by a weighted sum of the same two quantities. Minimizing the ratio of these two weighted
sums boils down a question about minimizing a specific bivariate function, which can be solved by direct
calculation.
1.2 Related Work
Wehave already discussed the foundationalwork on optimal search theory in economics, particlarlyWeitz-
man’s paper [12] that introduced Pandora’s problem and derived its solution. e optimality ofWeitzman’s
procedure turns out to be a special case of the Giins Index eorem [4, 5], which ironically was proven
earlier although Weitzman obtained his results independently and the connection between these two the-
orems was only realized aerward.
Doval [3] was the first to address Pandora’s problem with nonobligatory inspection, though special
cases were anticipated in earlier unpublished work by Postl [9]. In addition to examples illustrating that
optimal policies in general need to be adaptive (as described above), Doval’s main results identify sufficient
conditions for the optimal policy to have a simple structure. In particular, eorem 1 in [3] identifes a
sufficient condition under which the optimal policy is a commiing policy. e sufficient condition is quite
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technical, but one corollary is that a commiing policy is optimal whenever boxes have equal inspection
costs and are totally ordered by the “mean-preserving spread” relation. Doval also provides a complete
solution for the case when the boxes have equal costs, the value of each is sampled from a distribution
with two-point support, and the lower support point is the same for all boxes.
e blending of Pandora’s problem with ideas from combinatorial optimization and algorithmic game
theory was initiated by Kleinberg, Waggoner, and Weyl [8]. eir paper introduced a novel method for
analyzing optimal and approximately-optimal policies for Pandora’s problem and generalizations, by re-
lating the expected utility of the policy to expected values of related quantities in a simpler environment
without inspection costs. e paper primarily applies this method to analyze the price of anarchy of a
descending price auction when bidders face a cost to inspect their own value, but it also analyzes various
extensions including one in which inspection is optional; the price of anarchy of the descending auction
in this seing is shown to be no worse than 12 −
1
2e ≈ 0.316. Singla [10] applied the analysis technique
introduced in [8] to a much broader family of combinatorial optimization problems, providing a general
transformation to convert frugal algorithms (a type of greedy algorithm) for combinatorial optimization
problems into policies for solving combinatorial counterparts to Pandora’s problem, i.e., generalizations
in which the searcher still must pay a cost to open each box, but may be allowed to select multiple boxes,
subject to feasibility constraints on the set of selected boxes. As noted earlier, among the problems solved
in [10] is a constrained utility maximization problem featuring probing constraints that generalize the
probing constraint in our paired-box problem.
Adaptivity gaps have been studied for various stochastic optimization problems. Any such problem
consists of a set of elements whose values are independent random variables. e algorithm knows the
distributions of these variables, but not the actual realizations. e only way to learn the actual realizations
is to probe these elements. If the value of the optimal adaptive probing policy can always be approximated,
to within a factor of α, by the value of a simple policy that performs probes in a fixed, predetermined
order until a stopping time is reached, then we say the problem has an adaptivity gap of α. In one of the
earliest papers on adaptivity gaps in stochastic optimization, Dean, Goemans, and Vondrak [2] studied a
stochastic variant of the 0/1 knapsack problem, where items have deterministic values but their sizes are
independent random variables and the act of placing an item in the knapsack reveals its size. ey showed
that adaptivity gap is constant and provided constant factor non-adaptive approximations.
e proof of our main result makes use of adaptivity gaps for stochastic submodular optimization with
constraints on probing. Asadpour and Nazerzadeh [1] bound the adaptivity gap to 1 − 1e for maximiz-
ing stochastic monotone submodular functions when elements to probe should satisfy matroid feasibility
constraints. Adaptivity gaps for much more general families of constraints were subsequently proven by
Gupta, Nagarajan, and Singla [6, 7]. In addition to feasibility constraints over sets of elements to probe,
there may also be constraints on the ordering of the probes. Gupta, Nagarajan, and Singla showed a con-
stant adaptivity gap for submodular functions under arbitrary prefix-closed constraints on the sequence
of elements probed [7].
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we formally define our model and discuss two related problems: Pandora’s problem with
required inspection andmaximizing a stochastic monotone submodular function. enwe introduce a class of
search procedures called commiing policies and explain why the optimal commiing policy has a simple
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structure and is computationally easy to identify and implement.
2.1 Model
An agent has a set of n boxes. Box i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, contains a prize, vi, distributed according to distribution
Fi(vi) with expected value Evi. Prizes inside boxes are independently distributed. Box i has inspection
cost ci. While Fi and ci are known; vi is not.
e agent sequentially inspects boxes, and search is with recall. Given a set of uninspected boxes, U ,
and a vector of realized sampled prizes, v, the agent decides whether to stop or to continue search; if she
decides to continue search she decides which box in U to inspect next. If she decides to inspect box i, she
pays cost ci to instantaneously learn her value vi. If she decides to stop search, she can choose to select
whichever box she pleases, regardless of whether it is inspected or not. We use Ii as an indicator for box
i being inspected and Ai as an indicator for the agent obtaining box i. Since one box can be obtained,∑
iAi ≤ 1. e agent is an expected utility maximizer, where utility, u, is defined as the value of the box
selectedminus the sum of inspection costs paid. Given v, the vector of realized sampled prizes, and the two
vectors of indicator variables, A and I, respectively indicating which boxes were selected and inspected,
we have:
u(v,A, I) =
∑
i
(Aivi − Iici).
2.2 Required Inspection
Consider imposing the additional constraint that a box can only be selected aer it is inspected. In other
words, we require Ai ≤ Ii for each i.
Weitzman [12] finds the optimal procedure to maximize expected utility when inspection is required.
e optimal solution is an index-based policy, in which the agent inspects boxes in decreasing order of
their indices, σi, where σi is the unique solution to
Evi∼Fi
[
(vi − σi)
+
]
= ci
and is also known as the reservation value of box i. e search stops either when one of the realized values
is above the reservation value of every remaining uninspected box, or when the agent has inspected all of
the boxes.
Kleinberg et al. [8] develop a new interpretation of Weitzman’s characterization. ey introduce an
important property of policies that we will call “non-exposure”, defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Non-exposed Policy). A policy is non-exposed if it is guaranteed to select any inspected box
whose value is found to satisfy vi > σi. In other words, a policy is non-exposed if the event (Ii−Ai)(vi−σi) >
0 has probability zero, for every box i.
e key to the analysis of Weitzman’s optimal policy in [8] is a family of random variables κi
∆
=
min{vi, σi} defined for each box i. Kleinberg et al. prove that for any policy that satisfies the required-
inspection constraint Ai ≤ Ii, the net contribution of box i to the expected value of the policy is bounded
above by E[Aiκi], with equality if and only if the policy is non-exposed.
6
Lemma 2. [8] Given any Fi and any policy that satisfies Ai ≤ Ii pointwise,
E [Aivi − Iici] ≤ E[Aiκi]. (1)
Furthermore, this holds with equality for every box i if and only if the policy is non-exposed.
Lemma 2 can be interpreted as providing an accounting scheme that amortizes a policy’s expected
inspection costs by deducting them from the expectedvalue of the box it eventually selects. is accounting
scheme exactly characterizes the value of non-exposed policies, and furnishes an upper bound on the
value of every other policy. e benefit of the amortization is that it reduces the problem of analyzing
policies for Pandora’s problem to the (generally simpler) problem of analyzing rules for selecting boxes in
an environment where the value of box i is κi, and this value can be queried at no cost. A first application
of this technique is the following characterization of the optimal policy with required inspection, and its
expected utility.
Corollary 3. [8] Weitzman’s policy on boxes 1 ≤ i ≤ nwith distributions Fi and inspection costs ci, achieves
expected utility E[maxi κi]; the expected utility of any other policy cannot exceed this bound.
Since Pandora’s problem with nonobligatory inspection allows policies that may violate the inequality
Ai ≤ Ii, in the sequel we will need a generalization of Lemma 2 that pertains to such policies.
Lemma 4. Given any policy for Pandora’s problem with nonobligatory inspection, and any box i, let
κ˜i =
{
κi if Ii = 1
Evi if Ii = 0.
e inequality
E [Aivi − Iici] ≤ E[Aiκ˜i]. (2)
is always satisfied, and the two sides are equal for every box i if and only if the policy is non-exposed.
Proof. First observe that vi is independent of Ii, hence
E[vi | Ii] = Evi (3)
E[(vi − σi)
+ − ci | Ii] = E[(vi − σi)
+ − ci] = 0. (4)
Both of these equations will be used in the sequel.
To prove the inequality asserted in the lemma, we will prove the following inequality of conditional
expectations pointwise, then integrate over Ii.
E[Aivi − Iici | Ii] ≤ E[Aiκ˜i | Ii] (5)
ere are two cases to consider. When Ii = 0, Ai is conditionally independent of vi because the contents
of box i are never even inspected, so can have no influence on the decision whether to select box i or not.
Hence
E[Aivi − Iici | Ii = 0] = E[Aivi | Ii = 0]
= E[Ai | Ii = 0] · E[vi | Ii = 0]
= E[Ai | Ii = 0] · (Evi)
= E[Aiκ˜i | Ii = 0]
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which establishes that the integrands on the two sides of inequality (5) are equal when Ii = 0. When
Ii = 1 we use the equation κ˜i = κi = vi − (vi − σi)
+ in the following manipulation.
E[Aivi − Iici | Ii = 1] = E[Aiκ˜i +Ai(vi − σi)
+ − ci | Ii = 1]
≤ E[Aiκ˜i + (vi − σi)
+ − ci | Ii = 1]
= E[Aiκ˜i | Ii = 1]
Hence inequality (5) also holds when Ii = 1.
e final sentence of the lemma asserts a necessary and sufficient condition for equality in (2). To
justify this condition, note that every step in the derivation of inequality (2) is an equation except for the
inequality
E[Aiκ˜i +Ai(vi − σi)
+ − ci | Ii = 1] ≤ E[Aiκ˜i + (vi − σi)
+ − ci | Ii = 1]. (6)
Hence, strict inequality holds in (2) if and only if there is a positive probability that Ii = 1 and Ai(vi −
σi)
+ < (vi − σi)
+. e relations Ii = 1 and Ai(vi − σi)
+ < (vi − σi)
+ hold precisely when the policy
violates the definition of non-exposure.
2.3 Stochastic Submodular Maximization
Consider the problem of maximizing a stochastic monotone submodular function f with respect to a
matroid constraint M. Suppose f : Rn+ → R+ is a function of n random variables, namely, A =
{X1,X2, · · · ,Xn}. Assume f is submodular, meaning
∀x, y ∈ Rn+ f(x) + f(y) ≥ f(x ∧ y) + f(x ∨ y) (7)
where x ∧ y and x ∨ y respectively denote the coordinate-wise minimum and maximum of vectors x and
y.
A policypi picks the elements to inspect one by one (perhaps, based on the realizedvalue of the previous
elements) until it stops. Once pi stops, the current state is a random vector Θpi = (θ1, θ2, · · · , θn), where
θj denotes the realization ofXi, if i is inspected by the policy, and is equal to 0 otherwise. e objective of
stochastic submodular maximization is to optimize the expected value of a policy, i.e., Maximize
pi
E[f(Θpi)],
subject to feasibility. e feasibility constraint is modeled using a matroid. For a given matroidM defined
on the ground set of the aforementioned random variable set A, a policy pi is called feasible if the subset
of random variables it inspects is always an independent set ofM.
Asadpour and Nazerzadeh [1] compare the performance of the best adaptive and non-adaptive poli-
cies. In adaptive policies, at each point in time all the information regarding the previous inspections of
the policy is known. In other words, the policy has access to the actual realized value of all the elements it
has inspected so far. In contrast, non-adaptive policies do not have access to such information and should
make their decisions (about which random variables to inspect) before observing the outcome of any of
them. ey show that there exists a non-adaptive policy that achieves at least a 1− 1e ≈ 0.63 fraction of
the value of the optimal adaptive policy.
Lemma 5. [1] ere exists a non-adaptive policy that achieves 1 − 1e ≈ 0.63 fraction of the optimal policy
in maximizing a stochastic monotone submodular function with respect to matroid feasibility.
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We now use the multilinear relaxation of f to define the value of fractional non-adaptive policies [1]. A
fractional non-adaptive policy is determined by a vector y ∈ [0, 1]n. is policy inspects elements in the
(random) set Y , a set that is defined to include eachXi ∈ A with probability yi, independently for each i.
We use F (y) to denote the expected value obtained by the fractional non-adaptive policy associated
with y. Using the notationΘY to denote the random vectorΘpi when pi is the non-adaptive policy associ-
ated with set Y , we have
F (y) :=
∑
Y⊆{0,1}n
[(∏
i∈Y
yi
∏
i/∈Y
(1− yi)
)
Ef(ΘY )
]
. (8)
Lemma 6. [1] For any monotone submodular function with matroidM feasibility constraint, for any y in the
base polytope ofM, there exists an integral (deterministic) non-adaptive policy with expected value greater
than or equal to F (y).
2.4 Committing Policies with Nonobligatory Inspection
Consider the problem of maximizing expected utility for the box problem with nonobligatory inspection
(as discussed in Section 2.1). A class of policies that will be central to our analysis are the commiing
policies, which were discussed in Section 1 and are defined formally as follows.
Definition 7 (Commiing Policy). A policy is called commiing if there exists a partition of the n boxes into
two sets, S and T , and a total ordering of the elements of T , denoted by ≺, such that the following properties
hold.
1. e policy never inspects a box in S: ∀i ∈ S E[Ii] = 0.
2. e policy never selects a box in T before inspecting it: ∀j ∈ T E[Aj · (1− Ij)] = 0.
3. If j, k ∈ T and j ≺ k then the policy never inspects k before it has inspected j.
e set S is called the reservation set of the commiing policy.
Among commiing policies with a fixed reservation set, S, it is easy to identify the one that maximizes
expected utility.
Definition 8. Policy PS simulates running Weitzman’s optimal policy on a modified set of boxes, in which
the boxes in T = [n] \ S are unchanged, but each box in i ∈ S is modified so that its inspection cost is zero,
and its value distribution is a point mass on Evi. When the policy in the simulation inspects or selects a box
in T , policy PS performs the same operation. When it inspects a box in S, policy PS instead selects the same
box without inspecting it.
e proof of the following lemma is easy, and we defer it to Appendix A, along with the (also easy)
proofs of the remaining two lemmas in this section.
Lemma 9. For every S ⊆ [n], policy PS aains the highest expected utility among all commiing policies
with reservation set S.
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According to Lemma 9, the optimal commiing policy must be one of the 2n elements in the set {PS :
S ⊆ [n]}. In fact, it is easy to see that the optimal commiing policy must belong to a much smaller set
with just n+ 1 elements. DefineW to be the Weitzman’s optimal policy on the given (unmodified) set of
n boxes; equivalentlyW = P∅. Also, for i ∈ [n], define Pi = P{i} to be the optimal commiing policy
with reservation set {i}.
Lemma 10. e optimal commiing policy always belongs to the set {W,P1,P2, . . . ,Pn}.
Lemma 11. For any S ⊆ [n], the expected utility of policy PS can be computed in time poly(n, s), where s
is the maximum number of support points in any of the distributions Fi.
erefore, one can identify the optimal commiing policy in polynomial time by evaluating the ex-
pected utility of each policy in the set {W,P1,P2, . . . ,Pn} and selecting the best of these n+ 1 alterna-
tives.
3 1− 1
e
Approximation
In this section we analyze the worst-case ratio between the value of the optimal commiing policy and
that of the optimal policy.
eorem 12. At least one of policiesW and Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, achieves at least 1 − 1e ≈ 0.63 of the optimal
utility for the box problem with nonobligatory inspection.
We establish a correspondence between the box problem and stochastic submodular optimization. Re-
call from Section 2.3 that an instance of stochastic submodular optimization is specified by a set of random
variablesA = {X1,X2, · · · ,Xm}, a submodular function f : R
m
+ → R+, and a matroidM with ground
setA. A policy pi chooses (either adaptively or non-adaptively) a subset I ⊆ A of random variables whose
values it probes, subject to the constraint that I must be an independent set in M. e value obtained
when running policy pi is the random variable f(Θpi), where Θpi denotes the random vector (θ1, . . . , θm)
specified by seing θi = Xi if i ∈ I and θi = 0 otherwise.
Definition 13. [Associated Stochastic Optimization Problem] Given an instance of Pandora’s problem with
nonobligatory inspection, having n boxes with costs ci and values vi ∼ Fi, the associated stochastic opti-
mization problem hasm = 2n random variables denoted by
A = {X1,0,X1,1,X2,0,X2,1, · · · ,Xn,0,Xn,1},
submodular objective function
f(θ1,0, θ1,1, . . . , θn,0, θn,1) = max{θi,j : 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 0 ≤ j ≤ 1},
and matroid constraint M defined by the partition matroid whose independent sets are all the subsets of A
that contain at most one element of each pair {Xi,0,Xi,1}
n
i=1. e distributions of the random variables are
defined as follows: Xi,0 is drawn from the same distribution as κi, whereas Xi,1 is deterministically equal to
Evi.
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Probing the first element of pair (Xi,0,Xi,1) in the associated stochastic optimization problem cor-
responds to inspecting box i in the box problem. Probing the second element of the pair corresponds to
selecting box i uninspected. is correspondence is formalized by the following pair of policy transforma-
tions.
Definition 14. Let I denote an instance of Pandora’s problem with nonobligatory inspection, and let J
denote the associated stochastic optimization problem.
If pi is any (possibly adaptive) policy for Pandora’s problem I let Φ(pi) denote the adaptive policy for J
that simulates pi running in I and performs the following sequence of probes: whenever pi inspects box i, Φ(pi)
probesXi,0, and whenever pi stops and selects any box, Φ(pi) probes every variable in the set {Xj,1 : j ∈ U},
where U denotes the set of boxes in I that were uninspected at the moment when pi stopped.
If ρ is a non-adaptive policy for stochastic optimization problem J and B(ρ) ⊂ A is the set of random
variables that ρ probes, let S(ρ) denote the set of boxes {i | Xi,0 ∈ B(ρ)} and letΨ(ρ) denote the commiing
policy PS(ρ) for Pandora’s problem I .
In the following lemmas, as in the preceding definition, I denotes an instance of Pandora’s problem
with nonobligatory inspection and J denotes its associated stochastic optimization problem. If pi is a
policy for either problem I or J , we will use the notation u(pi) to denote the expected utility of running
policy pi. In the case of Pandora’s problem this means u(pi) = E [
∑
i(Aivi − Iici)]. In the case of the
associated stochastic optimization problem it means u(pi) = E [f(Θpi)].
Lemma 15. If ρ is a non-adaptive policy for J and Ψ(ρ) is the corresponding commiing policy for I , then
max{u(W), u(P1), · · · , u(Pn)} ≥ u(Ψ(ρ)) ≥ u(ρ). (9)
Proof. Since Ψ(ρ) is a commiing policy, the inequalitymax{u(W), u(P1), · · · , u(Pn)} ≥ u(Ψ(ρ)) fol-
lows directly from Lemma 10, so we focus on the inequality u(Ψ(ρ)) ≥ u(ρ) for the remainder of the
proof.
Couple the probability spaces of the two optimization problems such that when the prize inside box i
is vi, the value of random variableXi,0 equals κi = min{vi, σi}. Note that such a coupling exists, because
the random variables {Xi,0}
n
i=1 are mutually independent andXi,0 has the same marginal distribution as
κi by construction.
By construction, policy Ψ(ρ) = PS(ρ) is non-exposed. According to Lemma 2, then,
u(Ψ(ρ)) = E[max
i
κ˜i], (10)
where κ˜i = κi if i ∈ S(ρ) and κ˜i = Evi if i 6∈ S(ρ). As for u(ρ) = E[f(Θ
ρ)], by the definition of f and of
Θρ we have
u(ρ) = E[max
i
θ˜i] (11)
where θ˜i = Xi,0 = κi if Xi,0 ∈ B(ρ), θ˜i = Xi,1 = Evi if Xi,1 ∈ B(ρ), and θ˜i = 0 otherwise. In the
former two cases κ˜i = θ˜i whereas in the third case κ˜i ≥ 0 = θ˜i. Hence κ˜i ≥ θ˜i pointwise. Combining this
inequality with (10)-(11) and using the fact that the random variables {κ˜i}
n
i=1 are mutually independent,
as are {θ˜i}
n
i=1, the inequality u(Ψ(ρ)) ≥ u(ρ) follows.
Lemma 16. If pi is any (possibly adaptive) policy for Pandora’s problem I , and Φ(pi) is the corresponding
policy for the associated stochastic optimization problem, then u(Φ(pi)) ≥ u(pi).
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Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 15, couple the probability spaces of the two optimization problems such
that the value of the random variable Xi,0 equals κi = min{vi, σi}. By construction of policy Φ(pi), the
set of random variables it probes is {Xi,0 | Ii = 1} ∪ {Xi,1 | Ii = 0}. Hence, if we define κ˜i = κi when
Ii = 1 and κ˜i = Evi when Ii = 0, then we have
u(Φ(pi)) = E[max
i
κ˜i] ≥
∑
i
E[Aiκ˜i]. (12)
Lemma 4 implies the following upper bound on u(pi).
u(pi) = E
[∑
i
(Aivi − Iici)
]
≤ E
[∑
i
Aiκ˜i
]
(13)
Combining this relation with inequality (12) completes the proof.
Proof of eorem 12. If pi denotes the optimal policy for an instance I of Pandora’s problem with nonobli-
gatory inspection, and J denotes the associated stochastic optimization problem, let ρ denote an optimal
non-adaptive policy for J . We have the chain of inequalities
max{u(W), u(P1), · · · , u(Pn)} ≥ u(ρ) ≥
(
1− 1e
)
· u(Φ(pi)) ≥
(
1− 1e
)
u(pi)
where the first inequality is Lemma 15, the second is Lemma 5, and the third is Lemma 16.
4 4/5 Approximation for Two Boxes
In this section we show that for the case of two boxes, n = 2, the best of policiesW,P1,P2 achieves at
least 4/5 utility of the optimal policy. We also provide a tight example for the approximation factor.
eorem 17. At least one of policiesW,P1,P2 achieves at least 4/5 utility of the optimal policy for the box
problem with nonobligatory inspection in a seing with two boxes. is approximation factor is tight.
e proof supplies an upper bound on the optimal value by characterizing the optimal policy in the
two-box case. Using ideas similar to those of Asadpour and Nazerzadeh [1], given the optimal policy we
consider a corresponding fractional non-adaptive policy. By comparing the beer of the fractional non-
adaptive policy and a policy that leaves all boxes uninspected, with the optimal policy we show that 4/5
of the optimal is achievable.
Optimal Policy Characterization and Evaluation
We first characterize the potential optimal policies in a problem with two boxes. e following lemma
summarizes some trivial observations, hence its proof is omied.
Lemma 18. e optimal policy in the two-box problem with nonobligatory inspection falls into one of three
categories:
1. it always selects an open box;
2. it always selects a closed box;
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3. it sometimes selects an open box and sometimes a closed box.
In case 1, the policy is equivalent toW with expected utility equal to maxi κi.
In case 2, the expected utility equalsmaxi Evi. Suppose the equality holds for index j. In this casemaxi Evi ≤
Pj .
e best ofW,P1 and P2 achieves the optimal value in cases 1 and 2. erefore we only need to show
that the approximation holds for case 3 where the optimal policy starts with inspecting a box. Without
loss of generality, suppose that the optimal policy starts with inspecting box 1.
Lemma 19. If the optimal policy starts with inspecting box 1, it selects box 2 without inspecting it only if κ1
is less than threshold t where t is the solution to Ev2 = Emax{t, κ2}.
Proof. Consider the realized κ1. e agent has the option to choose between Ev2 (the value of selecting
box 2 without inspecting it) and Emax(κ1, κ2) (the value of emulating Weitzman’s policy). To maximize
the expected value, Ev2 is chosen only if κ1 ≤ t.
Let y = P(κ1 ≥ t). e optimal policy achieves utility E [max{κ1, κ2} · 1κ1≥t] + (1− y)Ev2.
Lemma 20. In the optimal policy that starts with inspecting box 1 and selects uninspected open box 2 with
probability 1− y, the expected utility achieved is E [max{κ1, κ2} · 1κ1≥t] + (1− y)Ev2. Let κ
′
1 be a random
variable distributed according to the conditional distribution of κ1 given the event κ1 ≥ t. en the expected
utility is
OPT = yEmax{κ′1, κ2}+ (1− y)Ev2. (14)
Lower Bound on the Optimal Non-adaptive Policy
Let NonAdapt be a fractional non-adaptive policy (defined in Section 2.3) that inspects each element with
the marginal probabilities of its inspection in the optimal policy. For our case, in pair 1, the first element
is inspected with probability 1 and the second element with probability 0. In pair 2, the first element
is inspected with probability y and the second element with probability 1 − y. Since the probability of
inspection of elements of each pair sums to 1, NonAdapt belongs to the base polytope of the partition
matroid.
Consider a modified random variable for the first element of pair 1 with a dominated distribution.
Let this random variable be 0 with probability 1 − y and κ′1 with probability y, where κ
′
1 is a random
variable distributed according to the conditional distribution of κ1 given the event κ1 ≥ t. Due to the
independence of random variables in non-adaptive policies and the monotonicity of maximization, this
modification results in a fractional non-adaptive policy with a (weakly) lower value. Since value 0 has no
effect in maximizing non-negative numbers, we can consider the following modified realizations for our
lower bound on the fractional non-adaptive policy: random variables κ′1, κ2 and Ev2 are inspected with
probabilities y, y, and 1− y respectively.
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By Formula (8), for the expected value of NonAdapt we have:
NonAdapt(y) ≥(1− y)3Ev2
+y2(1− y)Eκ′1
+y2(1− y)Eκ2
+y3Emax{κ′1, κ2}
+y(1− y)2Emax{Ev2, κ
′
1}
+y(1− y)2Emax{Ev2, κ2}
+y2(1− y)Emax{Ev2, κ
′
1, κ2}.
Using Eκ′1 + Eκ2 ≥ Emax{κ
′
1, κ2}, for the first four terms we have:
(1− y)3Ev2 + y
2(1− y)Eκ′1 + y
2(1− y)Eκ2 + y
3
Emax{κ′1, κ2} ≥ (1− y)
3
E(v2) + y
2
Emax{κ′1, κ2}.
Using the same argument, for the last three terms we have:
y(1− y)2Emax{Ev2, κ
′
1}+ y(1− y)
2
Emax{Ev2, κ2}+ y
2(1− y)Emax{Ev2, κ
′
1, κ2}
≥ [y(1− y) + y(1− y)2]Ev2 + y(1− y)E[max{κ
′
1, κ2} − Ev2]
+
≥ y(1− y)2Ev2 + y(1− y)Emax{κ
′
1, κ2}.
erefore
NonAdapt(y) ≥ (1− y)2Ev2 + yEmax{κ
′
1, κ2}. (15)
Another valid non-adaptive policy is P2 with value at least Ev2.
P2 ≥ Ev2 (16)
Inequalities 15, 16 and Lemma 10 imply:
max{u(W), u(P1), u(P2)} ≥ max{Ev2, (1− y)
2
Ev2 + yEmax(κ
′
1, κ2)}
Comparing the Optimal Adaptive and Non-Adaptive Policies
Wecompare the lower bound on the optimal non-adaptive policy,max{Ev2, (1−y)
2
Ev2+yEmax(κ
′
1, κ2)},
with the utility of the optimal policy from Equation (14), (1− y)Ev2+ yEmax(κ
′
1, κ2), and show that the
ratio is at least 45 . Note that by Lemma 19, Emax(κ
′
1, κ2) ≥ Ev2. Let Emax(κ
′
1, κ2) = aEv2 where a ≥ 1.
We have:
max{Ev2, (1 − y)
2
Ev2 + yEmax(κ
′
1, κ2)}
(1− y)Ev2 + yEmax(κ′1, κ2)
= (17)
max(1, (1 − y)2 + ay)
1− y + ay
≥


1
1−y+ay , if a ≤ 2− y
(1−y)2+ay
1−y+ay , if a ≥ 2− y.
(18)
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e formula for the first part is decreasing in a for a fixed y and achieves its minimum at a = 2−y. e
formula for the second part is increasing a with fixed y and therefore achieves its minimum at a = 2− y.
erefore the maximum ratio occurs at a = 2− y and is equal to:
1
1− y + (2− y)y
=
1
1 + y(1− y)
.
Since 0 ≤ y ≤ 1,
1
1 + y(1− y)
≤
1
1 + 14
=
4
5
.
is concludes the proof of eorem 17.
e following is a tight example for eorem 17.
Example 1. Consider boxes A and B. Suppose box A has value 0 with probability 12 and value 1 with proba-
bility 12 , and its inspection cost is 0. Box B has value 0 with probability 1 −
1
N and value N with probability
1
N ; and its inspection cost is
N−1
2N .
e optimal policy starts with inspecting box A, and if the value is 0, selects uninspected box B. If the value
of box A is 1, the optimal policy inspects box B and takes the maximum value of the two boxes. e expected
utility of this policy is
1
2
·
1
N
·N +
1
2
(
−
N − 1
2N
+
1
N
·N +
(
1−
1
N
)
· 1
)
=
1
2
+
1
2
(
3
2
−
1
2N
)
which approaches 54 as N goes to infinity.
Policies P1, P2 and W each achieve utility 1: Policy W , inspects both boxes and obtains the maximum
value. e expected utility in this case is −N−12N +
1
N · N + (1 −
1
N ) ·
1
2 . Policy P
1 starts by inspecting
box B. If box B has value N , it selects it. Otherwise it selects uninspected box A. erefore it has utility
−N−12N +
1
N ·N + (1−
1
N ) ·
1
2 . Policy P
2 inspects box A. If the value is 0, it selects uninspected box B. If the
value of box A is 1, it is indifferent between selecting box A and uninspected box B. e expected utility in this
case is 12 ·
1
N ·N +
1
2 · 1.
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A Omitted Proofs Concerning Committing Policies
In this section we reiterate and prove Lemmas 9 to 11, which concern the structure and computation of
optimal commiing policies.
Lemma 21 (Lemma 9 restated). For every S ⊆ [n], policy PS aains the highest expected utility among all
commiing policies with reservation set S.
Proof. Define a modified set of boxes as in Definition 8. Observe that in this modified problem instance,
for any box i ∈ S we have σi = Evi since ci = 0. Since the value of box i is deterministically equal
to Evi, whenever Weitzman’s policy inspects box i it finds that vi ≥ σi and hence it immediately selects
i. us, every execution path of Weitzman’s policy on the modified set of boxes can be represented by a
sequence of operations, each of which is either inspecting a box in T , selecting a box in T , or inspecting-
and-immediately-selecting a box in S. Policy PS duplicates each of these three types of operations and
receives the same cost or expected benefit whenever it performs one of them, hence the expected utility
of running Weitzman’s optimal policy on the modified problem instance equals the expected utility of
running PS on the original instance.
Wemust now show that no other commiing policywith reservation set S can aain a higher expected
utility. is is quite easy to do, using the fact thatWeitzman’s policy is optimal for the modified instance. If
pi is any commiing policy with reservation set S, there is a corresponding policyH(pi) for the modified
set of boxes that operates as follows: when pi inspects or selects a box in T , H(pi) performs the same
operation. When pi selects a box in S, H(pi) inspects and immediately selects that box. (ere is no need
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to define the behavior ofH(pi) when pi inspects a box in S since that event never happens.) e utility of
running H(pi) on the modified set of boxes is the same as the utility of running pi on the original set of
boxes, since the extra inspection operations that H(pi) performs on elements of S have zero cost. Since
the utility of running Weitzman’s policy on the modified set of boxes is an upper bound on the utility of
running H(pi), it follows that the utility of running PS is an upper bound on the utility of running pi, as
claimed.
Lemma 22 (Lemma 10 restated). e optimal commiing policy always belongs to the set {W,P1,P2, . . . ,Pn}.
Proof. Suppose S ⊆ [n] is any set of two or more elements, and consider any two distinct elements i, j ∈ S
with Evi ≥ Evj . A commiing policy with reservation set S can never open box i or box j, and the
operation of selecting closed box j is always dominated by the operation of selecting closed box i. Hence,
any commiing policy with reservation set S is dominated by a commiing policy with reservation set
{i}. In particular, the optimal such policy, Pi, has at least as much expected utility as PS .
Lemma 23 (Lemma 11 restated). For any S ⊆ [n], the expected utility of policy PS can be computed in time
poly(n, s), where s is the maximum number of support points in any of the distributions Fi.
Proof. Let us start with the case S = ∅,PS = W . According to Corollary 3, the expected utility of
Weitzman’s optimal policy,W , is equal to E[maxi κi]. Let Gi denote the cumulative distribution function
of κi, i.e.
Gi(t) =
{
Fi(t) if t < σi
1 otherwise.
en we have the formula
E[max
i
κi] =
∫ ∞
0
Pr(max
i
κi > t) dt =
∫ ∞
0
1− Pr(max
i
κi ≤ t) dt =
∫ ∞
0
(
1−
n∏
i=1
Gi(t)
)
dt.
e integrand on the right side is a step function with at most ns steps, since every discontinuity in the
step function belongs to the union of the support sets of the distributions of κ1, . . . , κn. Hence the integral
can be computed in time poly(n, s) by simply summing over the steps.
Computing the expected utility of policy PS in the general case of S ⊆ [n] reduces to the special case
PS = W , because the expected utility of PS is equal to the expected utility of Weitzman’s policy on a
modified set of boxes, as was shown in the proof of Lemma 9.
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